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Caller ID and the Great Privacy Debate:

Whose Phone Call Is It, Anyway?
I.

Introduction

Since its introduction in the last century, the telephone has
come to occupy a central position in the American way of life.1 As
America prepares to enter the 21st century, advances in telephone
technology promise a telephone system with vastly different characteristics from the one that we are used to.2 These technological advances in the telephone infrastructure are likely to alter fundamentally the nature of telephone service.
One of the most visible manifestations of this new technology is
the introduction by telephone companies of a new package of features, including Caller ID,3 which have been made possible by advances in signalling technology. Caller ID has sparked an often in4
tense debate about competing privacy interests in telephone service.
The Caller ID debate is instructive of the deficiencies in the current
approach to the introduction of new telephone technologies.
This Comment will examine the national debate over Caller ID
and will explore the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches to the problems presented by Caller ID. Part II examines
the history of switching technology and its impact on public perceptions of privacy interests in the phone system. Part II also details the
debate over Caller ID. Part III will analyze the current approaches
1. As of July, 1991, there were 95.5 million households in the United States with telephone service. This represents 93.3% of all households in the country. Telephone Subscribership In the U.S., Federal Communications Commission Mimeo No. 14744, released September
18, 1991.
2. Bell Atlantic is currently working on miniaturization of the telephone. Using bone
conductive technology for the transmitter as well as the receiver, the technology is expected to
result in phones which fit in the ear like a hearing aid. Coupled with cellular technology, such
a telephone would make a person instantly accessible through the telephone network at all
times. Such a development will make the telephone number more associated with a person
than a place, as it is now. Telephone In the Ear Developed For Bell Atlantic By Norris Communications, BUSINESS WIRE, July 8, 1991.
3. This bundle of services goes by different trade names. In the Bell Atlantic system, this
bundle of services is called Class (Custom Local Area Signaling Service) Calling, or I.Q. Services, and includes Caller ID, Repeat Call, Return Call, Call Trace, Call Block, Select Forward, and Priority Call. Caller ID has been the focus of some controversy. Caller ID identifies
and displays the calling party's telephone number to the called party. This technology has been
given different names by different telephone service providers. This Comment will use the term
"Caller ID" generically.
4. See, e.g., 'CallerID' Stirs National Debate On Phone Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1990, at 12NJI.
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to the regulation of Caller ID and explore their strengths and weaknesses. Part IV will examine some of the responses to the current
debate over Caller ID. Part V will explore the possibility and necessity of developing a new paradigm for evaluating the many new technologies which undoubtedly lie beyond Caller ID.
II.

Switching Technology and Its Impact On Privacy Interests

Most Americans participate in the telecommunications industry
as consumers of what has evolved into an essential human service.
By and large, consumers take the telephone system for granted.
Telecommunications users do not stop to think about how the system
operates and the ways in which the operations of the system shape
their lives. 5 The public's conception of the private phone call, automatically connecting the calling and called parties, was not developed as a conscious choice of what a telephone should be. On the
contrary, it is an incidental outgrowth of the technological imperatives that have driven the system.
A. The Technological History of the Phone System and Its Impact
On Privacy
The first telephone systems
consisted of a small number
of pri0
vate lines that connected one subscriber to another. These systems
were followed by exchanges that linked the increasing number of
telephones into systems enabling more subscribers to communicate
with one another. This system eventually grew to cover and link the
entire nation. 7 Limited switching technology constrained the early
network, and necessitated the involvement of that archetype of
5. While as a nation we have come to depend on universal telephone service as a fundamental communications link, it was not a necessary outgrowth of the invention of the telephone. The universal national phone system is the result of the vision and philosophy of the
men who founded the telephone industry in America, and is only one of several competing
models from which they could have chosen. For example, early European telephone systems
were used in a fashion similar to radio. An early system in Budapest was used to disseminate
news and musical entertainment. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Social Effects of the Telephone, in THE
TELEPHONE'S FIRST CENTURY AND BEYOND 13-15 (Crowell, 1977).
6. HERBERT N. CASSON. THE HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE 42-77 (1910). This volume
by Mr.Casson, written after the first wave of telephone pioneering, is an interesting look at the
early days of the industry. The modern consumer of telephone service, used to the monolithic
place of the telephone industry in contemporary society, will be surprised by the haphazard
birth and troubled infancy of the industry as set out by Mr. Casson. The book reflects the
uncritical acceptance of new technology characteristic of the era in which it was written, and
is an interesting counter-point to the current debate marking the present evolution in telephone
technology.
7. Id. at 141-169.
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American telephone culture, the operator. 8 The telephone industry's
infancy also saw a technological innovation, the bridging bell, which
created the party line.9
The operator and the party line, both of which were characteristics generated by the technological underpinnings of the system, defined the public's expectations of privacy in the early phone system. 10
Since the operator was the switch, her intervention was necessary to
place calls, regardless of the distance of the call. 1 ' The intervention
of the operator generally meant that she could identify who was calling whom. In addition, the party line meant that one never knew
who might be listening in on the line.' 2
The public expectation of privacy in the phone system changed
fundamentally with the advent of direct dialing, which resulted from
the conversion of the telephone network from manual to mechanical
switches."3 Mechanical switches are able to route the call from the
calling party to the called party without human intervention. 14 The
development of mechanical switches allowed telephone companies to
replace the operator as the routing agent of telephone calls. 15
By automating, the telephone company could route calls more
accurately, more quickly, and more cheaply.'" That this process also
allowed calling parties to maintain their anonymity was not of primary concern to the phone company.' 7 Anonymity for the calling
party was not an aim of the phone company, but a technological side
effect. 8
8. Id. Casson's treatment of the introduction of women to replace the boys who were
first used as the human component of the telephone switch is amusing in its reflection of the
sexual stereotypes of his day.
9. Id. at 148
10. See, e.g., In Re the Provision of Caller Identification Service by the Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 118 P.U.R.4th 464, 469 (Md.P.S.C. 1990).
11. BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES, A HISTORY OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE IN
THE BELL SYSTEM: THE EARLY YEARS (1875-1925) 548-549, (M.D. Fagen ed., 1975) [hereinafter HISTORY OF ENGINEERING].

12. Id. at 468.
13. The development of automated switching was not a discrete event, but was a process
which spanned nearly one hundred years. Id. at 550 n.73.
14. Id. at 544-615 (summarized at 613-615).
15. Id.
16. Automated switching systems were proposed as early as 1879, but they were not
deployed on a large scale basis until much later. This was due to the fact that improvements in
manual switching, which amounted to semi-automation, meant that the need for automated
switching was confined to certain situations. HISTORY OF ENGINEERING, supra note 16, at 54852. Automated switching was not introduced until it became an economic necessity, which was
in part a function of the availability of a suitable labor supply. Id. at 549-50, 549 n.72.
17. While the early proponents of automated switching were partially motivated by privacy concerns, the decision was ultimately an economic one. Id. at 549.
18. In the Caller ID debate, telephone service providers have argued that the present
ability of calling parties to maintain anonymity is a byproduct of technology. They further
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The increase in the number of subscribers with private lines,
that is, a one party line connected to the public switched network,
also increased telephone privacy.' Compared to a party line, there is
much less concern that other people will be monitoring the content
of one's phone conversation on a private line. The sanctity of the
private telephone call is now protected by wiretapping laws which
require the consent of at least one of the parties to the call before the
20
content of the call may be monitored.
While the evolution of the network toward private lines was perhaps more basic in its impact on privacy, the impact of direct dialing
on privacy was, in some ways, more profound. The removal of the
operator from the process of placing most routine phone calls made
the privacy of the calling party ascendant over the privacy of the
called party. 2' By controlling the disclosure of their identity, calling
parties infringe on the privacy of called parties' homes without any
reduction in their own privacy. Generally, any decision to reveal the
identity of the calling party rests with that party.
Since the introduction of the automated switch, the priority of
the calling party's privacy over the called party's privacy has become
the status quo in the telephone system. This status quo is now being
modified, again by the introduction of newer, more efficient switching technology.
B.

Signalling System Seven and Caller ID

The telephone industry is in the process of installing Signalling
System Seven, the latest generation of switching technology to be
widely deployed in the telephone system. 2 2 The primary impetus for
contend that Caller ID is a restoration of privacy expectations that were lost when automated
switching was introduced. See, 'e.g., In Re New York.Tel. Co., No. 91-C-0428 at 68
(N.Y.P.S.C. issued Nov. 19, 1991) (Recommended Decision of Admin. Law Judge John T.
Vernieu).
19. By the early 1960's over 60% of the Bell system was operating over private lines.
This number reached 85% by the early 1970's and was expected to go over 90% by 1980.
A.E. JOEL ET. AL., BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES, A HISTORY OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE IN THE BELL SYSTEM: SWITCHING TECHNOLOGY (1925-1975) at 384 (G.E. Schindler,
Jr., ed. 1982).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1988).
21. This is not to say that the telephone in its present configuration has not enhanced the
privacy of the called party in significant ways. One commentator noted that most polite people
nowadays would not think of dropping by another's home without calling first. This is a net
protection of privacy, substituting a minor annoyance for what can be a large imposition. Ithiel
de Sola Pool, supra note 5, at 17-18.
22. Signaling System Seven is being installed by all of the seven regional telephone companies. It is a fundamentally different signaling system, allowing the switching signal to be
transmitted along a channel separate from the phone call itself. This speeds the connection of
the call, and reduces the load on the trunk lines, which carry the call itself between the parties.
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this technological revolution is the telephone companies' desire to
maximize efficiency and to prepare the telephone system to deliver
the services demanded by the information age. 23 Like previous
changes in telephone technology, the introduction of Signaling System Seven promises to have a lasting effect on the public's perception of telephone service. 4
The introduction of Signaling System Seven has had many
ramifications for telephone service. Since the intelligent switch can
now process as well as transmit the signal, new services are possible.2 5 Signaling System Seven has allowed the telephone industry to
26
create Caller ID, and all of the controversy that surrounds it.
Caller ID receives the signal from the switch and displays the number of the calling phone on a screen. This service has been characterized as an "electronic peephole," allowing the called party to identify
27
who is calling before deciding to answer the phone.
Introduction of this new service has created a whole new privacy expectation for the called party. Unlike earlier services, however, the privacy expectation created by Caller ID does not spring
This is because the call does not go into the trunk line until the switches have verified that the
called party's line is open. This system has been made possible by the development of computerized "intelligent" digital switches, which are capable of processing the information sent from
both ends of the telephone transmission. SIGNALING SYSTEM SEVEN, BELL ATLANTIC TRAINING MANUAL 2-9 [hereinafter BELL MANUAL].
23. The telephone system of today will be the information highway of tomorrow. In
order to reach its maximum potential, the information age will require a National Information
Infrastructure, or NIl, serving for the flow of information as the superhighway system functions for the flow of goods. The telephone companies' conception of this infrastructure is their
Integrated Services Digital Network, or ISDN. ISDN will carry voice, video and data transmissions simultaneously over the line. For a discussion of the possibilities Nil presents and the
ability of ISDN to meet its needs, see Michael Dertouzous, Building the Information Marketplace; Planning An Information Infrastructure For Computer Use, 94 TECHNOLOGY REVIEW
28 (January 1991).
24. Developments in many areas of telephony have begun to converge to change the
telephone system. The telephone which will emerge from this process will be a complete communications link. This communications link will integrate computer data transmission, cable
video, and voice transmission. See supra note 23. The legal profession is already feeling the
impact of the telephone revolution, as is the study of law. The Author notes that a great deal
of the research on this Comment was done from the privacy of his basement through a telephone link to the LEXIS/NEXIS database of Mead Data Central.
25. In a recent speech before the annual convention of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Commissioner Joseph Rhodes, Jr., of the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission, noted that the distribution of intelligence throughout the telephone system
will result in a network that "will be almost ... literally intelligent." He sees this network as,
among other things, "possibly rendering business travel anachronistic." Joseph Rhodes, Jr.,
Privacy and Communications: Problems of Technology, Solutions of Choice, 103d NARUC
Convention and Regulatory Symposium (Nov. 11-14, 1991).
26. See, e.g., In Re New England Tel. and Tel. Co. [Phonesmart Service], Department's
Order in Docket No. D.P.U. 91-64 (Ma.D.P.U. filed Oct. 9, 1991) at 5 n.5.
27. See. e.g., In Re the Provision of Caller Identification Service by the Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 118 P.U.R.4th 464, 466 (Md.P.S.C. 1990).
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forth in a vacuum. It flies squarely in the face of the current privacy
expectations of the calling party. The conflict between the interests
of the called and calling parties has fueled a public debate about
telephone privacy.
The Caller ID debate implicates three different types of privacy
interests. First is the generic type of privacy that has been characterized as "the right to be left alone." 8 Second is the privacy right
inherent in the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.2 9 This right guarantees freedom from unreasonable government intrusions. In the area of telephones, the right
prescribes certain protections and procedures governing wiretapping." Third is the relatively new concept of "informational
privacy." 3 1
On its face, Caller ID seems at first to be unremarkable.3 2
Many people see the ability to screen phone calls that comes with
Caller ID as an enhancement to privacy. Called parties may now be
able to tell who is calling 3 before they answer the phone, thereby
allowing them to screen their calls. This ability to decide whether or
not to answer the ringing telephone does add to the privacy of called
parties. The debate, however, stems from the struggle to balance
called parties' privacy with calling parties' interest in maintaining
control over the release of their phone numbers.
28. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890). The famous article from which this quote comes began the process of recognition by the courts of a right to privacy. Dean Prosser divided the causes of action for infringement of the right into four classes. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383
(1960). The privacy right at issue in the Caller ID context is intrusion on the person's seclusion or solitude. Id.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. These restrictions are primarily statutory, and are found in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988), and state statutes modeled on it. These
statutes are discussed further infra, in IIIB.
31. Informational privacy is an emerging area focusing on an individual's right to control personal information. With the expansion of computer databases and their increasing accessibility, this right, or lack of it, is assuming more importance in the public debate on privacy. A thorough treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an
excellent discussion of this topic see Jonathan P. Graham, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1395 (1987).
32. Bell Atlantic first introduced Caller ID on a trial basis in New Jersey in 1987. This
trial was approved by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities without controversy, and was
widely hailed as a means to reduce obscene and harassing phone calls. It wasn't until the
proposed introduction of Caller ID in Pennsylvania that the concern over the privacy rights of
calling parties was raised. See supra note 4.
33. The pace of change in the telecommunications industry is relentless. A second generation of Caller ID technology that displays the name of calling parties as well as their phone
numbers is already on the market. Northern Telecom Introduces the First Residential Telephone Devices To Display Caller's Names, BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 11, 1991.
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III. Current Approaches
Presented by Caller ID
A.

ID

to Resolving

the Privacy

Conflicts

The Regulatory Responses

While the level of regulation of the telephone industry varies
from state to state, proposed services such as Caller ID generally
must be approved by a regulatory agency in the jurisdiction where
the service is proposed. At present, at least thirty state regulatory
bodies have dealt with Caller ID in one form or another.-4
It is in front of the various utility regulatory commissions that
the privacy battle over Caller ID has principally been waged. The
responses to Caller ID by different regulatory bodies fall into two
broad categories: unrestricted Caller ID,3 5 and Caller ID with some
means of blocking the transmission of telephone numbers.36 These
two responses represent differing views on which of the competing
privacy interests is more important.
Unrestricted Caller ID is favored by those commissions that believe that the privacy of the called party should be given the most
weight. Commissions favoring unrestricted Caller ID see the privacy
intrusion experienced by called parties as greater than the intrusion
of Caller ID on calling parties' privacy. 37 The calling party, in this
view, has little or no legitimate privacy interest, since the calling
parties' interest is categorized as an interest in anonymity. 38
As other people have recognized, the calling parties' interest is
in more than anonymity.3 9 The disclosure of a person's telephone
number is not identical to a disclosure of his identity. In some instances it is less, and in other instances it can be much more. Increasingly, for example, the telephone number is an identifier that
can be used by marketers and others to access a great deal of information about a person.' 0
34. Consumer Communications, YANKEEVISION (Yankee Group, Boston, Ma.) Vol. 10,
No.2, February 1993 at 7.
35. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n. v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 71 Pa.PUC 338
(1989), rev'd sub nom, Barasch v. Public Util. Comm'n, 576 A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990),
aff'd, 605 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1992).
36. See, e.g., In Re Diamond State Tel., 121 P.U.R. 4th 317 (Del. P.S.C. 1991).
37. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n. at 38, Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v.
Public Util. Comm'n., 584 A.2d 321 (1990).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n. v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., Docket No.
R891-200, at 51 (Pa.P.U.C. filed Sept. 22, 1989) (Recommended Opinion and Order of the
Admin. Law Judge).
40. The Public Utility Law Project of New York, Inc., (PULPNY) published a newsletter compiling a series of telephone industry advertisements aimed at potential business users of
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In arguing that called parties' privacy interests should be ascendant over calling parties' privacy interests, proponents of Caller ID
have rejected the traditional privacy interest of calling parties as an
accident of technology."' Since the intrusion on called parties is the
greater privacy invasion, proponents of Caller ID see it as an enhancement of privacy.4 Some proponents of Caller ID also argue
that calling parties surrender any privacy interest that they have by
placing the call.4" This stems in part from the fact that the tariffs
governing telephone service grant complete ownership of all telephone numbers to the telephone companies. 4
. The single most common reason offered for the introduction of
unrestricted Caller ID is its deterrent effect on harassing and obscene telephone calls. 4 5 By providing a means to quickly identify
abusive callers, Caller ID does undoubtedly have a chilling effect on
those persons who would use the telephone to reach out and annoy or
abuse others. 46 Those commissions that have placed restrictions on
the use of Caller ID have concluded that there are other less intrusive methods to accomplish this goal.' 7
The majority of commissions that have considered Caller ID
have adopted an approach that balances competing privacy interests
and allows Caller ID with some type of universally available blocking option.' 8 Since Caller ID is a function of switch programming, it
is possible to program the system to allow calling parties to block the
transmission of their phone numbers. Blocking may be accomplished
Caller ID technology. The advertisements detail the ways in which Caller ID technology, coupled with commercially available databases, can be used to display the calling party's "name
and address . . . wealth code .. . postal code . . . dwelling unit code (from single family unit
to 101-residences at the same address) . . . the year you were listed in the phone book...
and your title (Dr. Rev. Col. etc.)." A CONSUMER PRESENTATION OF WHAT YOU CAN EXPECT
FROM CALLER ID: IMAGINE WHAT YOU COULD Do WITH THAT INFORMATION, PUBLIC UTIL.
LAW PROJECT N.Y., June 12, 1991 at 3.
41. See, e.g., In Re New York Tel., Case No. 91-C-0428, at 68 (N.Y.P.S.C. filed Nov.
19, 1991) (Recommended Decision of Admin. Law Judge John T. Vernieu).
42. See, e.g., In Re Diamond State Tel. Co., 121 P.U.R.4th 317, 331 (Del.P.S.C. 1991).
43. See, e.g., In Re Provision of Caller Identification Service By the Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 118 P.U.R. 4th 464, at 466 (Md.P.S.C. 1990).
44. See, e.g., P.S.C.-Del.-No. 1, Local General Tariff, Section 1, Original Sheet 11,
General Regulations No. 19 Call Numbers.
45. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n. v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 71 Pa.PUC 338,
341 (Pa. P.U.C. 1989).
46. In New Jersey's Hudson County, where Caller ID was introduced in 1988, there has
been a 50% reduction in annoyance calls. Mike Capuzzo, Dial H for Harass, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 2, 1991.
47. For a discussion of Call Trace and Call Block, see infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Re Diamond State Tel. Co., 121 P.U.R. 4th 317 (Del.P.S.C. 1991).
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on a per-call basis, by adding a prefix to the called number.49 It may
also be done on a per-line basis, by programming the switch that
controls the calling line to block the transmission of that line's number for all calls.5"
No matter what form of Caller ID is approved, there is an inherent ability in the system to bypass it. The simplest method is to
use a pay telephone. In addition, credit card calls and operator assisted telephone calls do not transmit the number of the calling
party. 51 The main difference between these methods and a blocking
function is that these methods of avoiding Caller ID are more expensive and burdensome than a normal telephone call. 52 In those jurisdictions that have included universal blocking as part of the tariff for
53
Caller ID, at least per-call blocking is offered at no charge.
When a calling party elects to block Caller ID, the Caller ID
screen displays a message indicating that the number is blocked.5 4
For the residential subscriber to Caller ID, this information is in
many ways superior to the display of a telephone number.5 5 Commissions that require some form of blocking have made the determination that calling parties' privacy interest in their phone numbers
merits some protection. In allowing blocking, these commissions have
placed calling parties and called parties on a more even footing. 5
49. Id. at 332.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 323.
52. See, e.g., Re Diamond State Tel. Co., 121 P.U.R. 4th 317, 334 (Del.P.S.C. 1991).
53. Id. at 319.
54. See, e.g., In Re Provision of Caller Identification Service By the Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 118 P.U.R. 4th 464, 470-471 (Md.P.S.C. 1990).
55. While the customer does not get the number of the calling party, the customer does
get the information that the calling party does not wish to reveal his phone number. This tells
the customer immediately that the caller is probably not a friend, since the customer will
already have his friends' numbers. In such a case, the customer may be inclined to allow his
answering machine to take the call. When a number is displayed on the Caller ID unit, the
customer has only a binary piece of information. The customer either recognizes the number
or he does not. This does not tell the customer anything about the calling party. It may be
someone he knows calling from a strange telephone, such as a spouse stranded on the highway.
In such a case the customer will either take the call, or let his answering machine take the call.
Either way, the value of the service is arguably enhanced by the provision of the blocking
function. Interview with Irwin A. Popowsky, Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate of Pennsylvania (September 12, 1991)
56. The blocking feature still tilts the balance towards calling parties, since they may
block the transmission of their number, at their option. However, the relentless march of technology promises to place the calling and called parties in a more equal position. There is a
service in development which is called "Anonymous Call Rejection." This so-called "block the
blocker" feature would allow a subscriber with Caller ID to program his telephone to reject all
calls on which Caller ID is blocked. The Florida Public Service Commission has included in its
approval of Southern Bell's Caller ID, tariff instructions to the telephone company to develop
and deploy Anonymous Call Rejection as quickly as possible. In Re Southern Bell Telephone
and Telegraph Company, Docket No. 891194-TL, 1991 Fla PUC LEXIS 739 at *19
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There are several rationales for the requirement of some form of
blocking option. The most obvious reason is to protect the traditional
privacy interest of the calling party. 57 Another interest protected by
blocking is the heightened privacy expectations of telephone subscribers with unpublished numbers.5" Those commissions that have
rejected blocking have minimized these expectations by a strict construction of the tariff which governs unpublished numbers. 59
There are generally two types of unpublished numbers. First are
unlisted numbers, which the phone company will not publish in the
telephone directory.60 Second are private numbers, which the telephone company will not publish or give out through directory assistance.6 1 In rejecting the argument that Caller ID substantially undercuts these services, commissions have stressed that these tariffs
promise no more than what is explicitly contained in them.62 Since
Caller ID does not publish the number in the directory, or give it out
through directory assistance, it does not affect the status of unpublished numbers.6"
In requiring that Caller ID be provided with some type of
blocking, commissions are not blind to the problem of harassing and
obscene telephone calls." Rather, they have noted that other services
offered along with Caller ID will provide protection from telephone
65
terrorism, without the privacy problems associated with Caller ID.
These services are Call Trace, Call Block, and Call Return.
Call Trace allows the recipient of an objectionable call to have
the telephone number from which that call originated automatically
transmitted to the phone company.6" Call Block allows the recipient
(Fla.P.S.C. dated July 3, 1991).
57. See, e.g., In Re New England Tel. and Tel. Co. [Phonesmart Service], Docket No.
D.P.U. 91-64, at 21 (Ma.D.P.U. filed Oct. 9, 1991).
58. In Re The Application of The Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. to Offer Return
Call and Caller ID Within the District of Columbia, Formal Case No. 891, Order No. 9506,
at 16 (D.C.P.S.C. filed July 20, 1990).
59. See, e.g., In Re New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 86 P.U.R. 4th 308
(N.J.B.P.U. Sep. 25, 1987) (No. TT87070560).
60. Pennsylvania Pub Util Comm'n v. The Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., Docket No. R-891200,
at 80 (Pa.P.U.C. September 22, 1989) (Recommended Opinion and Order of the Admin. Law
Judge).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., In Re New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 86 P.U.R. 4th 308, 311
(N.J.B.P.U. Sep. 25, 1987) (No. TT87070560).
63. Id.
64. See e.g., In Re Diamond State Telephone Co., 121 P.U.R.4th 317, 331 (Del.P.S.C.
1991).
65. See, e.g., In Re New England Tel. and Tel. Co. [Phonesmart Service], Docket No.
D.P.U. 91-64, at 20 (Ma.D.P.U. filed Oct. 9, 1991).
66. -See In Re New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 86 P.U.R. 4th 308, 310
(N.J.B.P.U. Sep, 25, 1987) (No. TT87070560).
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of unwanted calls to permanently block calls from the offending telephone line. 67 Call Return allows subscribers to return a call to the
last telephone to call in on their line.68 The main drawback to these
services is that the subscriber must activate them before receiving
any other calls, since they only operate on the last telephone number
from which a call was received.6 9 These services may be as effective
as Caller ID in dealing with problem telephone calls. 7°
In general, public utility commissions have adopted an appropriate balancing approach in allowing Caller ID. To date, no public
utility commission has banned the introduction of Caller ID outright, although a Pennsylvania appellate court has. 71 Caller ID is
totally unrestricted in at least six jurisdictions,7" and several jurisdictions offer blocking only to a few discrete groups. 7 1 In addition to
state regulatory bodies, state legislatures are also beginning to examine the problem of competing privacy interests which Caller ID
creates.
B.

Statutory Constraints and the Judicial Response

The public debate over Caller ID has received some notice from
state legislatures. The legislatures in California and North Dakota
have enacted laws requiring that any tariff approving Caller ID must
provide free per call blocking. 71 State legislatures in New Jersey, 75
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. It is difficult to assess the deterrent effect of these services, since they are part of the
same bundle of services as Caller ID. They have not been introduced separately from Caller
ID in any jurisdiction. Since Caller ID has received much more publicity as result of the
privacy concerns it raises, it has gotten the credit for the reduction of harassing calls mentioned earlier. See supra note 46. Call Return, at least, may be able to accomplish many of the
same things that Caller ID does. Caller ID allows the recipient of an offensive call to return a
call to the caller. This is a way in which social pressure may be exerted to discourage such
calls. Not all contacts of this nature will rise to the level of vigilantism, contrary to the views
of some opponents of Caller ID. See In Re New York Tel. Co.'s Proposal to Institute Caller
ID Service, Docket No. 91-C-0428, at 49-50 (N.Y.P.S.C. issued Nov. 19 1991) (Recommended Decision of Admin. Law Judge John T. Vernieu).
71. Barasch v. Public Utility Commission, 576 A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), appeal
granted, Bell Telephone Company v. Public Utility Commission, 584 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1990). See
discussion infra part III.B.
72. Caller ID is available with no blocking in New Jersey, Virginia, and West Virginia,
see supra note 34.
73. See, e.g., In Re Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., Public Service Commission Order
No. 90-428, (S.C.P.S.C. filed April 19, 1990).
74. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2893 (Deering 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-21-01.6
(1991). This blocking feature would not work to block the transmission of the calling party's
number to emergency service providers. A Caller ID function is presently part of upgraded
emergency services operations being implemented across the country, generally referred to as
Enhanced 911.
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Pennsylvania, 6 and Virginia7 7 have also introduced bills that would
limit Caller ID. No jurisdiction has passed a bill banning Caller ID.
All of these bills impose the requirement that. Caller ID be offered with a blocking option. The bills in New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia are all legislative responses to the introduction of Caller
ID without universal blocking. They are legislative attempts to balance the rights of the calling and called parties where the utility

commissions have not done S0.78 The California and North Dakota
bills are legislative actions taken before the filing of any tariff seeking to implement Caller ID permanently.79 They preempt the utility
commissions and mandate a balancing of the rights of calling and
called parties.8 0
In addition to these bills aimed specifically at Caller ID, opponents of the service have challenged Caller ID as a violation of various state wiretapping statutes.8" Appellate courts in Pennsylvania 82
75. New Jersey legislators have introduced three separate bills since March of 1990.
The first, S.B. 2446, 203d Leg., 1989-1990 2d Sess. (N.J. March 12 1990), would require
blocking for all unpublished numbers. The second, A.B. 3353, 203d Leg., 1989-1990 2d Sess.
(N.J. April 23, 1990), would have limited Caller ID to residential customers, public safety
agencies and hospitals. The third, A.B. 4468, 204th Leg., 1990-1991 2d Sess. (N.J. Feb. 4,
1991.), would require provision of a blocking option to all subscribers with unpublished numbers. In addition, A.B. 4468 would require that all subscribers be able to obtain blocking by
giving a written request to the telephone company. The telephone company would be required
to provide a written offer to provide the blocking option to all subscribers. A.B. 4468 does not
specify whether the blocking option would be per-call or per-line, but does specify that blocking will be offered free of charge to all subscribers.
76. H.B. 165, Pa. 175th Gen. Assembly, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (Pa. January 30, 1991).
H.B. 165 provides that any call identification service offered in Pennsylvania would allow calling parties to withhold their telephone numbers free of charge. The bill is not clear as to
whether the blocking provided would be per-call or per-line.
77. See Legislative Roundup, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1991, at B3.
78. See supra note 34. Both New Jersey and Virginia have tariffs in place providing
unrestricted Caller ID. Caller ID is currently banned in Pennsylvania by judicial action. See
infra notes 81-118 and accompanying text. The tariff at dispute in the Pennsylvania courts,
however, provided Caller ID with only very limited blocking.
79. The Caller ID tariff pending in California at the time this Comment was written has
been withdrawn. See supra note 34.

80. See, e.g.,

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

§ 2893 (Deering 1991). In Section 2893(a) this

statute requires:
The commission shall, by rule or order, require that every telephone call identification service offered in this state by a telephone corporation, or by any other
person or corporation that makes use of the facilities of a telephone corporation,
shall allow a caller to withhold display of the caller's telephone number, on an
individual basis, from the telephone instrument of the individual receiving the
telephone call placed by the caller.
Id.
81. While the statutes vary from state to state, they are all modeled on the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. While no Caller ID
tariff has ever been challenged as a violation of the ECPA, a 1989 memorandum by the Congressional Research Service indicates that the use of caller identification equipment such as

Caller ID does violate the Act.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CALLER IDENTIFICATION

EQUIPMENT AND THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY

ACT CRS-8, October 18, 1989.
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and South Carolina8 3 have reviewed Caller ID's compliance with
wiretap statutes. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania ruled
that Caller ID is a violation of that state's Wiretap Act,84 even with
a blocking provision.85 The Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled
that Caller ID is not a violation of the sections of that state's code
87
governing trap and trace devices,8" even without a blocking option.
In Pennsylvania, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Michael C.
Schnierle addressed this question in his Recommended Opinion.88
The ALJ first. determined that a Caller ID device is a "trap and
trace" device within the meaning of the Wiretap Act,89 and so is
subject to the Act's restrictions, ° which would prohibit its use. The
ALJ then determined that Caller ID does not fall into any of the
82. Barasch V. Public Util. Comm'n., 576 A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), appeal
granted, Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 584 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1990).
83. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 1991).
84. Wire Tapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5701-5781
(1990).
85. Barasch v. Public Util. Comm'n., 576 A.2d 79, 90-91 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
86. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-29-10 to 17-29-50 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
87. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 1991).
88. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., Docket No. R-891200
(Pa.P.U.C. filed September 22, 1989) (Recommended Opinion and Order of the Admin. Law
Judge).
89. A trap and trace device is defined by the Act as:
A device which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of the instrument or device from which a wire or
electronic communication was transmitted.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5702 (1990).
The ALJ rejected Bell's argument that Caller ID does not "capture" the telephone number, but passively receives it from the switch. He also rejected the argument that Caller ID is
not a trap and trace device, as contemplated by the statute, because it is provided as part of
regular telephone service. He did so on the basis of the definition of a pen register in the same
section of the Act. This definition of pen registers specifically excluded devices used in the
ordinary course of business, while the definition of a trap and trace device does not. Pub. Util.
Comm'n. v. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. of Pa., supra note 88 at 36-41.
90. Section 5771 of the act provides:
(a) General Rule.-Except as provided in this section, no person may install or
use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order
under section 5773 (relating to issuance of an order for a pen register or a trap
and trace device).
(b) Exception.-The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to
the use of a pen register or a trap and trace device by a provider of electronic or
wire communication service:
(1) relating to the operation, maintenance and testing of a wire or electronic communication service or to the protection of the rights or property
of the provider, or to the protection of users of the service from abuse of
service or unlawful use of service; or
(2) to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect the provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire communication or a
user of the service from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of service, or
with the consent of the user of the service.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5771 (1990).

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1993

exceptions provided in the Act. 91 The ALJ concluded that Caller ID
could be offered lawfully only if it was provided with at least a free
per-call blocking option. 2
The majority of Commissioners of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission rejected the ALl's Recommended Opinion regarding
the Wiretap Act.9 3 The Commission approved Caller ID with blocking only for law enforcement agencies and individuals certified by
such agencies, and for certain domestic violence intervention agencies.9 4 The Consumer Advocate appealed the Commission's decision
to the Commonwealth Court.9 5
The Commonwealth Court overturned the Commission's decision, finding that Caller ID is a trap and trace device that would
violate the Wiretap Act. 96 The court went on to reject the AL's
decision that a blocking option would bring Caller ID within the exception provided in the Wiretap Act. 97 The court therefore found
91. The exceptions are contained in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5771(b) (1990), set out supra
note 90. Bell argued that the exception to the general prohibition against the use of trap and
trace devices provided in § 5771(b)(2) would apply to Caller ID since it is operated with the
consent of the user. The ALJ rejected this argument because Caller ID is used by the subscriber, who is not "a provider of wire or electronic communication services," as is required by
§ 5771(b). Public Util. Comm'n. v. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. of Pa., supra note 107, at 41-46.
92. Public Util. Comm'n. v. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. of Pa., supra note 88, at 57. The ALJ
ruled that the provision of at least per-call blocking might suffice to imply the consent of the
calling party to transmission of the phone number. This would bring Caller ID under the
exception contained in 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 5704(4) (1990), which provides that "[I]t shall
not be unlawful for: . . . (4) A person, to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication,
where all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception." Id.
The ALJ noted:
Because the terms "wire communication" and "oral communication", 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 5702, are limited to communications by human voice, the transfer of the signals required to activate the Caller ID unit would appear to be an electronic
communication which a party is authorized to record so long as all parties to the
communication have consented.
Public Util. Comm'n. v. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. of Pa., si~pra note 107, at 58.
93. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n. v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 71 Pa.PUC 338 (Pa.P.U.C. 1989).
Regarding the wiretap issue, the Commission stated:
Finally, we have considered the argument offered by some of the complainants that Caller ID violates the Commonwealth's anti-wiretapping law. The ALJ
accepted this argument. However, we believe that the ALJ was in error in his
interpretation of the recently enacted statute. In addition to our own reading of
the express language of the statute, we find significant the position of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth that Caller ID does not constitute a violation
of law.
Id. at 342.
94. Id.
95. Barasch V. Public Util. Comm'n., 576 A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), aft'd, Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 605 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1992).
96. Barasch V. Public Util. Comm'n., 576 A.2d at 85.
97. The court noted that "whether wholesale blocking was made available by Bell to the
general public, either free or for charge, the potential for privacy violations still exists." Id. at
88. In concurring with the majority that Caller Id violates the Wiretap Act, Judge Pellegrini
noted that "[tlhe Wiretap Act, however, gives no support to the idea that the privacy rights
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that Caller ID is a violation of Pennsylvania law and blocked its
introduction. 98 This decision was affirmed by a unanimous decision
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 99
In contrast to the. Pennsylvania experience, the Supreme Court
of South Carolina has ruled that unblocked Caller ID is not a violation of that state's Wiretap Act. 00 The Public Service Commission
(P.S.C.) of South Caiolina approved a tariff providing Caller ID
with limited blocking for law enforcement agencies and crisis centers.10 1 This order was challenged by the Consumer Advocate for the
State of South Carolina as a violation of the state's Trap and Trace
Law, 102 and the P.S.C. issued an order stating that it was not the
proper body to decide that issue.103
The telephone company filed a declaratory action in Common
Pleas Court, and that court held that Caller ID did not violate the
state's trap and trace law.1 0" The Consumer Advocate appealed to
05
the South Carolina Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court.
While Barasch and Southern Bell reach opposite conclusions,
that the General Assembly was trying to protect can be secured by shifting the burden to
individuals to protect their right of privacy." Id. at 94.
98. Id. at 91.
99. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 605 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1992).
100. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E. 2d 775 (S.C. 1991).
101. In Re Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., Public Service Commission Order No. 90428, (S.C.P.S.C. filed April 19, 1990).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-29-10 to 17-29-50 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
103. Public Service Commission Order No. 90-530 (S.C.P.S.C. Filed-May, 1990).
104. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, No. 90-CP-40-2686 (C.P. Richland S.C.
filed Nov. 20, 1990). The. trial court held that even if Caller ID were a trap and trace device,
it would fall under the exceptions contained in S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-29-20(B). This statute is
identical to 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5771(b) (1990), supra note 90, except that the consent of
the user provision in § 577 1(b)(2) is a separate subsection, S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-29-20(B)(3).
The trial judge noted that the purpose of Caller ID is to protect against abusive and harassing
telephone service. This brings it under the exception in § 17-29-20(B)(1) & (2). Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. v. Hamm, No. 90-CP-40-2686, at 7 (C.P. Richland S.C. filed Nov. 20, 1990).
Even if it does not fall under these subsections, the court held that Caller ID falls under the
consent of the user provision of § 17-29-20(B)(3). Id. at 7-I1.
The court distinguished the South Carolina statute from the interpretation of 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5771 in Barasch v. Public Util. Comm'n., supra note 95. The court noted that
the statutory scheme governing wiretapping in South Carolina lacks the all party consent rule
contained in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5704, which was relied on by the court in Barasch. It found
that the user contemplated by § 17-29-20(B)(3) was the Caller ID subscriber, and his consent
was sufficient. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., No. 90-CP-40-2686, at 7-11 (C.P. Richland
S.C. filed Nov. 20, 1990). The argument that the exception applies only to the provider of the
service, and not to the Caller ID subscriber, was not addressed by the court.
105. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 1991). The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the analysis of the trial court that the goal of S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-29-10 to 17-29-50 is to protect the users of the telephone system from
unwanted intrusions by third parties. 409 S.E.2d at 778. In the absence of the all-party consent rule which the court in Barasch relied on, the court found no violation of the South
Carolina statutory scheme. Id.
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they point out a common problem in applying existing statutes to
new telephone technologies. In both cases, the courts decided that
the technology either violated the law or it did not. Neither was able
to achieve the balancing of privacy interests that typifies the legislative responses aimed directly at Caller ID. Any statute that may be
enacted in response to new technology may eventually be subjected
to judicial interpretation. However, the enactment of legislation specifically aimed at new technology is more likely to achieve a balanced result than is an attempt to use an existing statute to shape
that technology.
C.

Constitutional Constraints on Caller ID

In addition to the statutory arguments addressed by the courts
in Barasch and Southern Bell, the parties also raised constitutional
objections to Caller ID. 10 6 The two courts split on the constitutional
question as well. The court in Southern Bell found that there is no
violation of constitutional privacy rights inherent in Caller ID,"°7
while the court in Barasch found that Caller ID violates Pennsylvanians' constitutional right to privacy.108
As a general rule, in order for courts to find a violation of constitutional rights, there must be some form of state action.10 9 Both
the Barasch and Southern Bell courts relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Jackson' v. Metropolitan Edison Co.' 10 in making this
determination. Jackson dictates that requisite to a finding of state
action a court should consider "whether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself.""'
The Southern Bell court answered this question in the negative. " 2 The court did, however, go on to examine the constitutional106. Barasch V. Public Util. Comm'n., 576 A.2d 79, 86-89 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990);
Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E. 2d at 778-780.
107. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E. 2d at 780.
108. Barasch V. Public Util. Comm'n., 576 A.2d at 89.
109. When the regulation of a public utility raises the activities of the utility to the level
of state action is a complicated question, and is beyond the scope of this Comment. Readers
interested in an analysis of this question in the context of the Caller ID debate should see
Glenn C. Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It Constitutionalto Give It Out?: Call Identification Technology and The Right to Informational Privacy), 37 UCLA L. REV. 145 (1989).
110. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Ill. Id. at 350.
112. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d at 779. The court held that
"[allthough the application for revision [of Bell's tariff] and the hearing were required by state
law, in no way could the PSC be said to be responsible for or to have coerced the institution of
the service." Id.
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ity of Caller ID "in the interest of settling this matter with finality." 1 1 The court weighed the interest of calling parties in not
revealing their numbers against the called party's right to be free
from abusive calls, and found no constitutionally protected right violated by the service.1"
In Barasch, the court found that the greater involvement of the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in Bell of Pennsylvania's
Caller ID tariff did raise the tariff to the level of state action. 1 5 The
court then looked at a series of cases that provide Pennsylvanians
with a greater degree of privacy under the Pennsylvania Constitution
than is afforded by the U.S. Constitution, and concluded that Caller
ID would violate Pennsylvania's constitutional privacy rights."' The
result of this decision was that Caller ID, even with universal percall blocking, was not allowed in Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to reach this question
on appeal.1 17 The court ruled that since it affirmed the Commonwealth Court's statutory analysis, it was unnecessary to reach the
113. Id.
114. Id. at 779-80. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy where the calling party voluntarily reveals the number called to the telephone company) and found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in not having one's telephone number revealed. The court reasoned
that the calling party voluntarily conveys his number to the phone company, as was the case in
Smith. Given the holding in Smith and the fact that the calling party has no property rights in
the telephone number to begin with, the court held that "Caller ID service simply does not
violate any right that rises to the level of constitutional protection. No fundamental interest is
involved in the anonymity of a telephone number." Southern Bell, 409 S.E. 2d at 780.
115. Barasch v. Public Util. Comm'n., 576 A.2d 79, 87 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), appeal
granted, Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 584 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1990). The court found the
relevant nexus between the state and the challenged service in the procedural history of the
case. The court stated:
Not only did the Commission require extensive hearings in selected locations
throughout the Commonwealth, but its further action in ordering limited blocking to certain designated individuals or groups to prevent harm absent a request
by the parties to do so and requiring a certification process to be implemented by
Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies effectively takes this case out of
the realm of mere regulation of private enterprise and transforms the Commission's decision into one of state action.
Id.
116. Id. at 87-89. The court relied on Commonwealth v. Beauford, 475 A.2d 783
(Pa.Super. 1984), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 496 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 1985), for
the proposition that "an individual has a right to privacy in the use of his or her telephone and
that unauthorized disclosure of one's telephone will not be permitted by the courts of this
Commonwealth." Barasch v. Public Util. Comm'n., 576 A.2d at 88. In addition, in Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1989), the court stated: "Telephone activities are largely
of one piece, and efforts to create distinctions between numbers and conversational content are
constitutionally untenable in our view." Id. at 1259. The court then concluded that Caller ID,
even in a blockable format, violates the privacy rights of Pennsylvanians. Barasch, 576 A.2d at
89.
117. Barasch v. Bell Telephone Co., 605 A.2d 1198, 1203 (Pa. 1992).
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constitutional issue. The court also hinted in dicta that the provision
of Caller ID with a free universal blocking option might not offend
the Pennsylvania constitution. " '
As the Southern Bell and Barasch cases show, an appeal to constitutional guarantees in accommodating competing interests in new
technology is likely to be an all or nothing proposition. As in the
application of existing statutes to new technologies, there may be little opportunity to seek compromise between the competing interests
involved. In addition, the decision of a court that a new technology
offends a constitution may have the effect, as it did in Pennsylvania,
of barring the introduction of the technology in any form. In the
long run, this type of absolute answer may not serve anyone's best
interests.
IV.
A.

Responses to the Debate Over Caller ID
Moves Towards Federal Preemption

The Caller ID debate has begun to receive notice at the federal
level, with responses coming from the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) 1 9 and Congress.12 0 Both of these initiatives
would balance the rights of called and calling parties, although to
differing degrees.
The FCC filed a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on September
26, 1991, and invited comments on the proposed rule's contents. 2 '
The Proposed Rulemaking seeks to institute some form of blocking
for interstate Caller ID, but rules out per-line blocking.' 22 It posits
some type of per-call blocking, but leaves open the question of
whether blocking should be automatic or operator assisted. The Proposed Rulemaking also does not specify whether blocking should be
provided at no cost. 23
The Congressional response is more favorable to the calling
party's privacy interest than is the FCC's Proposed Rulemaking.
Representative Edward Markey introduced The Telephone Con118. Id.
119. The FCC has invited comment on a proposed rule to set a standard for interstate
Caller ID. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 91-281, 1991 FCC LEXIS 5102
(FCC September 26, 1991) [hereinafter Notice].
120. Two bills were introduced in 1991 addressing the Caller ID issue. In the Senate,
The Telephone Privacy Act of 1991 S. 652, 102d Cong., IstSess. (1991); in the House of
Representatives, Telephone Consumer Privacy Rights Act, H.R. 1305, 102d Cong., IstSess.
(1991).
121. Notice, supra note 119.
122. Notice, supra note 119, at *3.
123. Notice, supra note 119, at *3.
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sumer Privacy Rights Act of 1991 on March 6, 1991.124 This bill
would require all common carriers offering Caller ID to provide percall blocking free of charge.1 25 The bill would also restrict the ways
in which the called party may use telephone numbers and billing
information received through automatic number identification (ANI)
12 6
services on 800 and 900 numbers.
Senator Herb Kohl introduced The Telephone Privacy Act of

1991 in the Senate on March 13,

1991.121

This bill would amend the

Electronic Communications Privacy Act 12 8 to allow a trap and trace
device to be attached to a telephone line with the consent of the user
only if per-call blocking were provided free of charge. 129 This bill
does not contain the ANI protections which are contained in the
Telephone Consumer Privacy Rights Act of 1991.130
All three of these initiatives seek to balance the privacy rights
of called and calling parties, but they accomplish this goal in different ways. All three also seek to impose some standardization on the
provision of Caller ID. They reflect a concern that exists in some
quarters about the divergence among the states over the form in
which Caller ID is introduced.'
These responses also reflect, to
some degree, a desire for a uniform level of privacy rights for users
13 2
of the telephone system.
124. Telephone Consumer Privacy Rights Act, H.R. 1305, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
The Act would amend the Communications Act of 1934 by adding a new section to Title II of
that act.
125. Id. at § 227 (b)(l)&(2)
126. Id. at § 227(c)(1). This section of the bill would prohibit users of call identification
services from reselling the telephone number received through ANI, or "any information derived from the automatic number identification service, or any information derived from analysis of the characteristics of a telecommunications transmission (such as calling patterns and
locations, transmission speeds, and transactions profiles)." Id. at § 227(c)(1)(B)&(C). Such
information could only be sold with "the affirmative consent of the customer." Id.
127. Telephone Privacy Act of 1991, S. 652, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Since this
Comment was written, Senator Kohl reintroduced this legislation as The Telephone Privacy
Act of 1993, on March 18, 1993. Telephone Privacy Act of 1993, S.612, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993). This new legislation does contain the ANI protections noted supra note 126.
128. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1988).
129. Telephone Privacy Act of 1991, supra note 127. This Bill does not specifically refer
to call identification services. It assumes that Caller ID is a trap and trace device, which is an
assumption that not all courts or commissions would agree with. See, e.g, Southern Bell Tel.
and Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 1991).
130. Telephone Privacy Act of 1991, supra note 127.
131. See, e.g., Troublesome ANI Issue Must Be Resolved By Congress, NETWORK
WORLD, October 7, 1991.
132.

Id.
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B. The New York Public Service Commission's Statement of Policy On Privacy In Telecommunications
The New York Public Service Commission, responding to the
debate over test marketing of Caller ID in New York,1 33 issued a
notice setting out eight principles of telephone privacy, and invited
comment on them."' The purpose of the principles is to "make explicit the need to consider privacy-related issues posed by new services, and offer a framework, including rebuttable presumptions, for
deciding those issues. ' 13 5 After public comment, the principles were
amended and adopted by the Commission on March 22, 1991.131
These principles are an attempt on the part of the Commission
to define the privacy expectations involved in the telecommunications
system in advance of the introduction of new services. 3 7 While these
principles draw heavily on the Caller ID experience, they are general
enough to have applicability to technologies beyond Caller ID.
The principles stress the need for an open network '38 and the
133. The New York Public Service Commission approved a test marketing of Caller ID
services in the Rochester area in January of 1990. Re Rochester Tel. Corp., Item 501, Jan. 10,
1990 as reported'in Review of Current Cases, 125 PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY 56 (March
15, 1990).
134. Notice Requesting Comment On Proposed Privacy Principles, Case 90-C-0075
(N.Y.P.S.C. filed November 16, 1990).
135. Id. at 5.
136. Statement of Policy On Privacy In Telecommunications [hereinafter Policy on Privacy], Case 90-C-0075, 1991 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 26 (N.Y.P.S.C. filed March 2, 1991). Principle I requires that tariff filings for new telephone services must take privacy concerns into
account. Principle 2 stresses the need for an open network, and suggests that methods employed in protecting privacy should keep this end in view. Principle 3 stresses the need to
educate consumers about the privacy implications of new services. Principle 4 stresses the desirability of choice among various levels of privacy for consumers. Principle 5 requires thata
company introducing a service that lowers the level of privacy in the system must offer a
means of restoring the lost privacy, or show cause why it cannot. Principle 6 sets out some
presumptions for pricing of new services related to privacy levels. Principle 7 restricts the use
of subscriber specific information about telephone usage, and provides for informed consent for
dissemination of such information. Principle 8 recognizes that privacy expectations may
change over time, and that privacy expectations and technology may impact each other. Id.
137. The first principle of the eight contained in the order states:
Privacy should be recognized explicitly as an issue to be considered in introducing new telecommunications services. To that end, supporting material for tariff
filings related to new or substantially modified services should include, along
with other pertinent information, an analysis, consistent with these principles, of
the reasonably ascertainable implications, if any, of the new service for privacy,
or a statement, with explanation, that there are no such implications.
Id. The requirement that new telephone services will have to be accompanied by a privacy
analysis will serve to sensitize the telephone service provider to privacy concerns. Preparation
of these analyses will point out problem areas to the provider, and will help the provider shape
the service to minimize its impact on privacy. From an economic standpoint, the telephone
service provider will have an incentive to analyze the privacy implications of a service at an
early stage in its development. Doing so early in the process should lower the cost of conforming the service to privacy expectations.
138. Id. This principle suggests that privacy problems should be solved by allowing cus-
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desirability of letting users select the level of privacy they desire. 139
Where new services are introduced that compromise current levels of
privacy, the service provider would be required to offer services that
restore the lost privacy. 14 0 The principles also recognize that privacy
expectations may change over time" ' and stress the need for educating users of the system about new services and their impact on privacy. 42 In addition to dealing with new services, the use of information about the customer generated by the service provider is
restricted.143
The approach taken by the New York Commission is novel. The
main advantage of this approach is that it attempts to define some of
the privacy interests involved before a battle over a particular new
technology is joined. It also provides notice to the telephone service
provider as to what will be expected of new technologies. The specification of parameters to which the technology will be expected to
conform also allows the provider to shape the new technology before
it is introduced.
The New York principles were challenged during the public
comment period on jurisdictional grounds. " ' This is one of the drawbacks to this approach. The comments that were made reflect some
confusion over whether the principles have the force of law or are
only advisory." 5 In any event, the principles are a laudable attempt
to define and balance some of the competing interests in the area of
new technologies and telecommunications privacy.
V. The Need For A New Paradigm for Evaluating New Telephone
Technologies and Their Impact On Privacy Interests
If one fact has emerged from the Caller ID debate with any
tomers to establish barriers to the network rather than having barriers to the system that the
customer would need to overcome. It suggests resolution of problems on a customer by customer basis rather than by system-wide provisions.
139. Id. at *62. Also, Principle 6 states that customers who elect to subscribe to new
services that enhance the level of privacy should pay for that privilege, while those maintaining
the existing level of privacy in the system should be allowed to do so for free. Policy on Privacy, 1991 N.Y. PUC LEXIS at *62.
140. Id. The service provider would have to show good cause for not providing a means
for restoring lost privacy if it sought to introduce a new service without such means. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at * 62.
143. Policy on Privacy, 1991 N.Y. PUC LEXIS at *63. Principle 7 provides that subscriber specific information will not be disseminated without the customer's consent. It also
provides that customers should be able to require compensation for use of information about
them. Consideration would be given to whether or not non-regulated companies were also subjected to the requirement to provide such compensation. Id.
144. Id. at *2-*8.
145. Id.
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degree of certainty, it is that the way in which new technologies are
deployed is in need of rethinking.'" The starting point in this process must be a conscious effort to define the relationships between
users of the system as we desire them to be,' 47 in order to have the
technology conform to that ideal.
Caller ID is an excellent vehicle for this process. Caller ID has
been championed as an "electronic peephole" which can restore the
lost privacy interests of the called party. 4 1 While this is an apt metaphor, it does not perfectly represent the situation presented by
Caller ID. The interest of the called party in not revealing his telephone number is often mischaracterized as an interest in anonymity.' 4" It is not, since Caller ID does not reveal the calling party's
name, but rather his telephonic address.
The telephone industry asserts as the primary benefit of Caller
ID that it will reduce obscene and abusive telephone calls.35 However, Caller ID could accomplish this same end without the transmission of the calling party's telephonic address. As was noted
above,' 5' a newer version of Caller ID, already being introduced, displays the calling party's name as well as his telephone address. Had
there been an incentive to, the telephone industry could have introduced Caller ID as a service which displays only the calling party's
146. The Pennsylvania experience with Caller ID is illustrative of this point. Bell of
Pennsylvania's Tariff was filed over three years ago, and Caller ID is still not available to
Pennsylvania telephone subscribers. Dicta in Barasch v. Bell Telephone Co., supra note 118,
intimates that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might hold that Caller ID with per-call blocking does not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. Had consideration been given to privacy
concerns before the company sought to introduce the service, Pennsylvania telephone consumers may well have been enjoying the benefits of Caller ID for the last three years.
147. In an era of rapidly expanding technology, as the Caller ID debate shows, there is
concern that new technologies will erode privacy. However, Caller ID has the potential to
expand privacy as well. Technologies such as Caller ID can suffer from an analysis that is
focused on expectations of privacy in the current system. Such an analysis will often see the
introduction of a new technology as a zero sum game, with an advance in the called party's
privacy 'necessarily coming at the expense of the calling party's privacy. In fact, Caller ID
could be configured in such a way as to expand the privacy of all parties to the system. See
infra notes 152 and accompanying text. Such applications of technology may not be apparent.
Finding such applications may require that the technology be evaluated from a viewpoint not
tied to the constraints of the current system.
148. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 91-281, 1991 FCC
LEXIS 5102, at *2 (FCC September 26, 1991).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775, 779. While
the problem of obscene phone calls is usually associated with residential customers, some businesses apparently are also victims. In recent testimony before the California Public Utilities
Commission, Barbara Bondick, chief executive of Linda's Lip Service, expressed enthusiasm
for Caller ID. It seems that phone sex services are prime targets for obscene phone calls.
Michael Taylor, New Way to Trace Numbers: Debate Over "CallerID" Plan, S.F. CHRON.,
June 26, 1991, at Al.
151. Northern Telecom, supra note 33.
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name.1 52
The debate over Caller ID pits the privacy interest of the called
party against the privacy interest of the calling party. The reality of
the situation is not that clearly defined. All users of the system are
both called and calling parties, and these interests need to be seen as
complementary as well as competing. The problem with the present
configuration of Caller ID is that it transmits the calling party's telephone address, making this minute's calling party the next minute's
called party. Any attempts to resolve the privacy issues presented by
new technologies must attempt to balance privacy interests on an
individual, as well as'a system-wide basis.
The debate over Caller ID has suffered from the way in which
the issues have been framed. By asserting that Caller ID is primarily
intended to deter abusive use of telephone service15 a and by casting
the calling party interest as an interest in anonymity, many privacy
issues have been obscured. While there are legitimate interests in
anonymity,"' the concern over Caller ID goes well beyond this issue.
As was noted above, there is a growing concern over what has
been classified as informational privacy.1 55 One of the main concerns
about Caller ID is the potential commercial exploitation of the service. Opponents fear the use of Caller ID in developing detailed
compilations of consumption patterns and consumer interests. 56 As
more powerful computer technology becomes increasingly available,
the public's ability to control personal information will be further
152. Given that Caller ID is in large part a function of "smart" technology, the possible
configurations of the system are limited mainly by the imagination of the system's programmers. By combining blocking, Anonymous Call Rejection, and the telephone companies' new
answering machine services, a system could be created in which a Caller ID equipped line
could route all blocked calls to the telephone company's answering service for retrieval at the
customer's convenience. Another service could be devised which would route all calls, except
those originating from specified numbers, to the answering service, restoring to the subscriber's
home a level of tranquility which was lost in the early part of this century.
153. While a detailed analysis of the pricing structure of regulated public utilities is
outside of the scope of this Comment, it is interesting to note that Caller ID is not offered as
part of basic telephone service. This means that it is charged at a higher rate and the profits
are used partially to subsidize basic service. See, e.g., In Re Diamond State Tel. Co., 121
P.U.R.4th 317, 329 (Del.P.S.C. 1991). If Caller ID is really intended to deter abusive calls,
one would expect it to be offered as a basic service. Why should consumers have to pay a
premium price to be protected from abuse?
154. Much of the most vocal opposition to Caller ID has come from organizations which
seek to help victims of domestic violence. Many women who flee from abusive situations are
forced to make contact with the abuser for various reasons. Caller ID could lead to the disclosure of the location where such women are staying. This is only one example of situations where
Caller ID could work more injury than it prevents. See, e.g." In Re Provision of Caller Identification Service By the Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 118 P.U.R. 4th 464, 467
(Md.P.S.C. 1990).
155. See Jonathan P. Graham, supra note 31.
156. See PUBLIC UTIL. LAW PROJECT N.Y., supra note 40.
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eroded.157
As telephone numbers become more identified with people than
with places, their utility as personal identification numbers will increase. Telephone subscribers must be given some control over their
telephone numbers as part of the definition of basic telephone privacy. As noted above, current tariffs grant sole ownership of telephone numbers to the telephone companies. This must be changed.
While the telephone companies need to maintain operational
control over telephone numbers, subscribers need to be given control
over dissemination of their numbers as a means of protecting basic
privacy. This would be best served by recognizing that subscribers
have a legitimate property interest in their telephone numbers.
Balancing the telephone companies' need to maintain control
over the technical use of the telephone number against the subscriber's need to maintain control over the social use of telephone
numbers might best be accomplished through the grant of a limited
license to the subscriber. This form of property right would recognize the telephone companies' ownership of the number, while allowing the subscriber to decide how and to whom the number is disseminated. Since the limited license is a contract right, it is flexible
enough to meet the needs of both the telephone companies' and their
subscribers.
The approach of the New York Public Service Commission in
prospectively setting out some parameters for new technology also
has a great deal to offer. As was discussed above, it provides the
telephone industry both with a framework within which to evaluate
new technology, and an incentive to conform that technology to existing privacy concerns. State regulatory bodies, however, may not be
an appropriate forum for the debate needed to shape such principles.
The type of debate required in making a determination as to
what level and forms of privacy are desirable in the telephone system
is a function more properly left to the legislative forum.1 58 The level
of privacy which is desired in the system is a complicated question,
157. This concern was demonstrated recently when Lotus Development Corp. attempted
to develop and market a database called Lotus Marketplace. The product was a database on
CD-ROM that listed the names, addresses shopping habits and likely incomes of 80 million
American households. The product touched off a storm of controversy over the privacy implications of making such a detailed database available to anyone with a personal computer. In
response to the controversy, the product was abandoned, and has not been marketed. See, e.g.,
Glenn Rifkin, Licensee Is Now Selling a Lotus Database, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1991, at D-5.
158. While the legislature may lack the technical expertise of the regulatory agencies, it
can draw on the agencies for technical support. This handicap is more than offset by the wider
attention that a debate in the legislature will draw.
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and legislatures are more practiced at the type of policy debate involved. In addition, the legislature is a forum more suited to the
compromises which will need to be made in order to develop workable principles which balance competing interests.
Whether this debate is best undertaken at the federal or state
level is a more difficult question to answer. The resolution of such
fundamental questions may be best left to the national level in order
to insure that all citizens' rights enjoy the same level of protection.
Additionally, the need for an integrated and cohesive national telephone system argues against allowing the states to develop a
hodgepodge of different types and configurations of telephone
service.
On the other hand, one participant in the Caller ID debate has
suggested that the divergence among the states over the configuration of Caller ID is a positive development.1 59 The divergence among
the states allows them to operate as laboratories, and provides the
opportunity to allow the market to determine what type of service is
desired.16 0 Should problems develop in the national telephone system
as a result, federal authorities could step in. Regardless of where this
debate takes place, it should be undertaken, and soon.
VI.

Conclusion

The Caller ID debate has pointed out the dangers of allowing
the technology employed by the providers of telephone service to define the level of privacy expected from the system. In the face of
rapidly expanding technology, such an approach is no longer possible
or desirable.
The privacy concerns inherent in the system must be comprehensively defined, and a mechanism devised for balancing them.
New technologies must be evaluated against these concerns, and
ways to configure the technologies to maximize the privacy of all
parties should be sought.
In order to facilitate this process, privacy principles should be
derived which will provide a framework within which new technologies can be developed. Out of both basic fairness and economic efficiency, providers of telephone service need to be informed of what
society's demands as to privacy are. This will allow technology to be
developed consonant with these demands. Indeed, an effort to define
159. Kenneth Gordon, Chairman, Maine Public Utilities Commission, in The Current
And Future Implications Of the Caller I.D. Debate, 6 KMB VIDEO JOURNAL (1991).
160. Id.
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exactly what privacy is desired in the system may provide the telephone industry with new opportunities to develop new services.
In an era of technological expansion, protection of basic privacy
interests cannot be left to technological imperatives. Reasonable expectations of privacy should drive the introduction of new telephone
services and technologies rather than be defined by them.
Peter F. Kriete

